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SPECIAL ARTICLE |
Dr. Felthous is Professor, Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, St. Louis University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO. Address correspondence to: Alan R. Felthous, MD, Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, St. Louis University School of Medicine, 1438 South Grand Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63104-1027. E-mail: felthous{at}slu.edu
Free will is regarded by some as the most and by others as the least relevant concept for criminal responsibility. Contributions from religious and philosophical thinkers over the classical and medieval Christian eras demonstrate that, despite the passionate and historically consequential debates over the meaning of "freedom," the unifying theme that joined the will with the intellect remained persistent and pervasive. Leading historical jurists in England eventually dropped the descriptor "free," but retained the central importance of the will to criminal responsibility and emphasized its dependence on the intellect to function properly. Modern rationalist philosophers denied the will's metaphysical freedom, but not its existence. Today the neurosciences reveal more and more about how the will functions, even as lawyers and psychiatrists hesitate to utter the word. In properly avoiding metaphysical freedom within forensic inquiry and discourse, it is a grave conceptual mistake to overlook the will itself. Once greater conceptual clarity on the empirical nature of the will is achieved and accepted, the law itself could rediscover the core mental faculty behind human agency, the will.
This article has been cited by other articles:
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  A. Buchanan Commentary: Freedom and Function J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, March 1, 2008; 36(1): 25 - 26. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
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